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  For many years, policy makers have been searching for measures that will reduce 
the growth in healthcare costs.  One approach that has gained increasing attention is tort 
reform, a broad term encompassing various laws that limit the tort exposure of healthcare 
providers.  Physician groups, private health insurers, and both Presidents Bush and 
Obama have argued that tort reform will reduce healthcare costs.
1  As a theoretical 
matter, however, limiting tort liability could increase or decrease healthcare costs.  On the 
one hand, liability incentivizes health providers to take greater precautions and avoid 
unnecessary or risky procedures.  Thus, reducing the liability of providers could increase 
costly medical errors and the practice of “inducing” demand, i.e. delivering profitable but 
unnecessary and potentially risky treatments.  On the other hand, critics of the tort system 
argue that courts lack the capability to accurately identify negligent care, and further that 
providers’ sensitivity to liability leads to excessive care (or “defensive medicine”).   The 
net impact of reform is an empirical question of significant policy interest. 
In this study, we exploit variation in state-level timing of reforms to assess the 
impact of specific types of reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums.  
Most non-elderly Americans receive health benefits through such plans, so premiums are 
a strong indicator of the impact of reforms on aggregate costs.  We identify four specific 
reforms with sufficient enactment/strikedown activity to be evaluated during our study 
period: caps on non-economic damages, caps on punitive damages, collateral source 
reform, and joint and several liability reform.  We match state-level data on the timing of 
these reforms to a privately-gathered national database of insurance contracts agreed 
upon by a sample of large, multisite employers between 1998 and 2006.   We separate the 
sample into fully-insured and self-insured contracts, as both product characteristics and 
                                                 
1 President’s Remarks at the 2004 President’s Dinner. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 
/releases/ 2004/07/20040721-14.html.  Presidential Debate Transcript (10/15/2008).  Available at 
 http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/27086587/page/4/.  America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) buys 
advertisements promoting tort reform, arguing that medical malpractice liability has increased the cost of 
providing health insurance.  AHIP asserts that “the current litigation system for compensating patients 
injured by medical negligence is expensive, slow, and does little to benefit the injured patients". Available 
at http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?bc=39|341|320.    
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regulations differ by this distinction.
2 We also examine whether the impact of reform 
varies by plan type, specifically managed vs. non-managed plans.  Kessler and McClellan 
(2002) find that tort reform and managed care are to some extent substitutes for each 
other.  Just as tort reform reduces the incentive for doctors to undertake defensive 
medicine, HMOs manage care to reduce unnecessary procedures. 
We find evidence that each of these reforms, save caps on punitive damages, is 
associated with reductions of 1-2 percent in self-insured premiums.   By contrast, there is 
little evidence that tort reform affects fully insured premiums.  The limited response of 
fully insured premiums is consistent with the dominance of HMOs in this market.  We 
confirm this by separating responses among the insurance types within the self-insured 
sample.  As expected, most of the observed reductions are attributable to premium 
decreases for PPOs rather than managed-care plans (HMOs and point-of-service (POS) 
plans).  
We extend our analysis by investigating whether the estimated effects are 
moderated in local markets with less competition among insurers. To the extent insurers 
possess market power, the pass-through of cost reductions due to tort reform will be 
incomplete. Using the same insurance data source, Dafny (2009) finds evidence that 
insurers exercise market power in an increasing number of local geographic markets.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find suggestive evidence that pass-through of savings 
is largest in the most competitive markets. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I provides background on tort reform and 
reviews relevant prior work. Section II discusses the data, Section III the identification 
strategy, and Section IV the results. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 In a “self-insured” plan, employers are responsible for their employees’ medical costs, though employers 
retain a health plan as an administrator and may purchase stop-loss coverage.  By contrast, in a “fully 
insured” plan the insurer is responsible for payment.  
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I.  Tort Reform and Healthcare Costs 
  Tort reform can affect healthcare costs through two mechanisms: (1) direct 
liability costs and (2) costs associated with intensity of treatment.  Liability costs are 
comprised of medical malpractice premiums, malpractice damage awards in excess of 
premiums, and the associated litigation costs.
3  These costs are generally believed to 
comprise a small share of total healthcare costs, at most two percent (Congressional 
Budget Office 2004).  Therefore, tort reform cannot plausibly reduce healthcare costs 
much by limiting liability costs.  If tort reform is to have a substantial effect on healthcare 
costs, it must affect treatment intensity, which implies that providers must be sensitive to 
liability pressures. 
As noted, the effect of tort reform on treatment intensity is theoretically 
ambiguous.  Indeed, the potential for tort law to improve or distort incentives to provide 
optimal care has long been debated in both the legal and economic literature.  Ideally, tort 
law encourages providers to take proper precautions and yields improvements in patient 
care.  While extra care may mean more spending on treatments, it may reduce costs 
arising from medical errors.  There is certainly strong evidence of high rates of 
preventable medical errors.
4  In recognition of the depth of this problem, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services recently implemented tougher reimbursement policies 
for treatment provided to correct medical errors.
5  In addition, tort liability may deter 
doctors from pursuing unnecessarily risky but profitable courses of treatment.  There is 
also ample evidence that physicians “induce demand” when there are financial rewards to 
doing so (see Gruber et al (1999) for a review).   
However, tort law may distort incentives as well.  Tort liability may be only 
weakly correlated with negligent care, yielding few benefits.  (The failure of malpractice 
insurance companies to systematically experience-rate physicians constitutes suggestive 
                                                 
3 The administrative costs of the courts are largely socialized. Of course, plaintiffs bear a portion of the 
litigation costs as well; we do not explicitly consider these in our discussion.  
4 The Institute on Medicine (2000), relying on several epidemiological studies that reviewed actual patient 
records, concluded that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year due to “preventable medical 
errors.”  The report is available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/4/117/ToErr-8pager.pdf. 
5 “Not Paying for Medical Errors,” The New York Times, August 21
st, 2007.   
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evidence for this view.) Worse still, the threat of liability could persuade physicians to 
prescribe tests and procedures that are not medically necessary, but which may help the 
physician avoid litigation.  Defensive medicine thereby piles on costs borne not by the 
physician but by the patient and insurers, and by definition provides little (and potentially 
negative) value to patients.    
  
  a.  Tort reform and malpractice liability 
 
  Recent work confirms that tort reform is effective in reducing physicians’ liability 
exposure.
6  In his survey of the literature, Holtz-Eakin (2004) concludes caps on damages 
are consistently found to reduce the number of lawsuits and the size of awards.  Most 
recently, Avraham (2007) examines medical malpractice settlements.  He finds that some 
tort reforms decrease the number of claims by roughly five to thirteen percent and total 
annual payouts by more than fifteen percent.
7  The reduction in the probability of 
lawsuits may have a greater impact on provider behavior than the reduction in awards 
themselves. Medical malpractice insurance and the bankruptcy remoteness of many 
assets (such as homes and retirement savings) generally protect physicians from having to 
pay large awards.  As a result, the reduction in the probability of a lawsuit (with its 
attendant damage to reputation and psychic and time costs of litigation) may be more 
relevant to providers’ behavior than the actual financial risk they face.    
  Another strand of this literature assesses the effect of tort reform on medical 
malpractice insurance premiums.  This literature finds limited evidence that rates of 
                                                 
6 Early studies on tort reform focused mainly on the impact of tort reform on direct medical liability costs 
such as average award size, frequency of lawsuits, or the price of malpractice insurance.  Other studies 
have explored the effect of tort reform on medical malpractice insurance variables such as premiums, loss 
ratio, and losses incurred.  These studies often found mixed results and were plagued with selection issues 
(for reviews of previous literature see Zuckerman, Koller, and Bovbjerg [1986]; Holtz-Eakin [2004]). 
7 Specifically, Avraham (2007) finds that caps on non-economic damages and limitation of the doctrine of 
joint and several liability reduced the number of annual payments, and that caps on non-economic damages 
and periodic payment reform reduced average awards.  Additionally, caps on non-economic damages were 
found to reduce total awards, although this finding was only weakly significant..  The other reforms had no 
statistically significant effect on total annual payments.  In their working paper, Currie and MacLeod 
(2006) also find that reforms reduced malpractice payouts.    
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growth in malpractice premiums have been slower on average in states that enacted caps 
on pain and suffering damages than in states with more limited reforms.
8  
b.  Tort reform, physician behavior, and healthcare costs 
 
  As noted earlier, the direct effects of tort reform (on litigation costs, damage 
awards, and malpractice premiums) are unlikely to generate sizeable decreases in 
healthcare costs.  For this reason, many researchers focus attention on the reaction of 
providers to tort reform.   
  To date, all of the empirical work on provider responses to tort reform focuses on 
a specific condition, namely heart disease or pregnancy.  The most frequently cited 
evidence that tort reforms reduce healthcare costs is from Kessler and McClellan (1996).  
Using data on all elderly Medicare beneficiaries treated for serious heart disease in the 
years 1984, 1987, and 1990 and a panel of state reforms, Kessler and McClellan find that 
"direct" reforms (such as limitations on damages) reduce medical costs by 5 to 9 percent 
within 3 to 5 years of adoption without substantially affecting mortality or medical 
complications.
9  Kessler and McClellan (2002) obtain similar estimates using more recent 
data for the same population, and they also document smaller impacts in states with 
greater HMO penetration.  They conclude that tort reform and managed care are partial 
substitutes.  Tort reform reduces the incentives of doctors to supply defensive medicine, 
while managed care may actively prevent doctors from undertaking defensive medicine.  
Thus we anticipate that tort reform will have a smaller impact on premiums for managed 
care plans, a hypothesis we can test directly because our data identifies plan types.   
  The evidence from a different medical condition, pregnancy, is mixed.  Dubay, 
Kaestner, and Weidman (1999) find greater liability pressures are associated with 
increased use of Caesarean sections, and no improvement in infant Apgar scores.  Sloan 
et al (1995) also find no systematic improvement in birth outcomes (birthweight and 
Apgar scores) due to greater liability pressure.  Consistent with the conclusions of 
                                                 
8 Danzon et al (2004) and GAO (2003).  
9 Kessler and McClellan (1996, pp. 371-2).  The "direct" reforms include: caps on pain-and-suffering 
damages, caps on punitive damages, abolition of the collateral source rule and mandatory prejudgment 
interest. The "indirect" reforms include: contingency fee reforms, periodic payments, joint and several 
liability, and patient compensation funds.   
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Kessler and McClellan, these findings suggest tort reforms reduce costs with no adverse 
effect on outcomes.  Recent work by Currie and MacLeod (2008), however, suggests the 
reverse for some reforms.  Currie and MacLeod find that caps on damages and collateral 
source reform increase the complication rate for deliveries and the use of more expensive 
procedures.  The authors conclude that limitation of liability makes it easier for 
physicians to pursue riskier procedures that are more remunerative but offer no offsetting 
benefits to patients.  If this result generalizes across specialties and procedures, certain 
reforms could increase health care costs as physicians induce demand, less encumbered 
by the threat of liability.  By contrast, Currie and MacLeod find that joint and several 
liability reform improves outcomes because it places more liability on the doctor (as 
opposed to the hospital and other providers), who may have the most control over care.   
In sum, the research focusing on individual conditions is inconclusive. Moreover, 
it is difficult to estimate the net effect of tort reforms on healthcare costs by extrapolating 
from studies on specific conditions.  The insurance data we use enables us to provide an 
estimate of the aggregate effect of reform.  A key disadvantage, however, is that we will 
be unable to assess how these reforms impact health outcomes, which are very difficult to 
aggregate across a broad swath of conditions.  
c.  Tort reform and Insurance Plans 
 
  As previously noted, tort law may have different impacts across insurance plans.   
If managed care plans effectively monitor utilization through review, gatekeepers, or 
financial incentives, then tort reform and managed care may be substitutes.  Research 
prior to the mid-1990s found that HMOs reduced treatment intensity by as much as 
fifteen percent.  (See Glied 2000 for a literature survey).  Papers using data from the last 
ten years are more mixed, suggesting that HMOs and other plan types have converged as 
even indemnity plans have adopted some utilization review. (See Glied 2003 for a 
literature survey).  Most starkly, Altman et al. (2003), using a database of Massachusetts 
state employees, found that while HMOs were substantially less costly, little if any of the 
difference could be attributed to reductions in treatment intensity.  By contrast, Carlin 
and Town (2008), using claims data from 2002-2005 for a large, self-insured Midwestern  
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employer, find HMOs use 16 percent fewer “relative value units”
10 than other plans 
(which are POS or CDHP plans), conditional on the same health status of the insured 
population.  In sum, the literature suggests that managed care has potential to reduce 
treatment intensity, but the magnitude is disputed.   
 Because  we  can  measure the effect of tort reform on HMO premiums versus other 
types of coverage, such as PPOs, we can directly estimate the effect of tort reform on 
premiums for different insurance types.  We can also distinguish between the funding 
arrangement for each plan type (i.e. self insured versus fully-insured).  The 
responsiveness of self-insured HMO premiums to tort reform may be further attenuated 
because federal law exempts self-insured plans from state tort liability for wrongful 
denial of coverage (though provider liability for negligence remains).  
II.  Data  
  Our primary source is the Large Employer Health Insurance Dataset (LEHID).  
LEHID contains information on all of the healthplans offered by a large and non-random 
sample of employers between 1998 and 2006, inclusive.  LEHID is gathered and 
maintained by a leading benefits consulting firm, and the employers included in the 
dataset have some past or present affiliation with the firm.  The unit of observation is the 
healthplan-year.  A healthplan is defined as a unique combination of employer, market, 
insurance carrier, and plan type, e.g. Company X’s Chicago-area Aetna HMO.  We now 
discuss each of the components that jointly identify this unit of observation in turn. 
  The full dataset includes observations from 813 employers.  Most employers are 
large, multi-site, publicly-traded firms, such as those included on the Fortune 1000 list.  
The leading industries represented include manufacturing (110 employers), finance (101), 
and consumer products (73), although nonprofit and government sectors are also 
represented (43 in the “government/education” category).  Employers may enter or exit 
the sample at any time.  The median number of years an employer is present in the 
sample is two.  One-quarter of employers appear in the sample for 4 or more years.  A 
                                                 
10 Medicare developed the Resource-Based Relative Value Units scale to measure the resources used to 
provide care, so this implies the gatekeeper function results in fewer resources consumed by enrollees.  
This result does not incorporate differences in the prices paid to providers, which may compound the cost 
advantage of HMOs.  
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small number of employers reappear after exiting.  Given the frequency of exit and entry 
into the sample, it is not feasible to restrict analysis to a balanced sample of firms.  We 
revisit this issue in the empirical analysis below.  
 Geographic  markets are defined by the source using 3-digit zip codes.  The 139 
markets reflect the geographic boundaries used by insurance carriers when quoting 
premiums, and collectively cover all of the continental U.S., with the exception of a few 
rural areas.  Large metropolitan areas are separate markets, and non-metropolitan areas 
are lumped together within state boundaries, e.g. “New Mexico – Albuquerque” and 
“New Mexico – except Albuquerque.”
11   
  Each firm that administers any plan in the data is labeled an “insurance carrier.”  
During the entire study period, there are 357 carriers that serve at least one employer, of 
which 195 serve 5 or more.  The smaller carriers tend to be local or regional firms, or 
sometimes “third party administrators” who pay claims and contract with another carrier 
to “rent” its network of providers and associated discounts.  
  The plan types, ordered from most to least restrictive in terms of provider choice, 
are Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Point of Service (POS), Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO), and Indemnity.  HMOs and POS plans control utilization of care 
through primary-care physicians (“gatekeepers”).  Only in-network providers are covered 
by HMOs, while POS plans provide some coverage for out-of-network providers (once 
the gatekeeper has approved the service in question).  PPOs engage in less utilization 
management, and like POS plans, typically cover out-of-network care at a reduced rate.  
Finally, indemnity plans are traditional fee-for-service arrangements in which benefits do 
not depend on the network status of the provider.   
  In addition to the elements that jointly define a plan, we have the following 
variables: premium, insurance type, demographic factor, plan design factor, and number 
of enrollees.  Premium is expressed as an average amount per enrollee; it therefore 
increases with the average family size of enrollees in a given plan.  Premium combines 
employer and employee contributions.  The definition of premium depends on insurance 
type, which refers to whether a plan is self-insured or fully insured.  Many large 
                                                 
11 There is only one market that crosses state boundaries, “Massachusetts – Southern and Rhode Island.” A 
map of the markets is available in Dafny (2008).    
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employers choose to self-insure, outsourcing benefits management and claims 
administration but paying realized costs of care.  Such employers can spread risk across 
large pools of enrollees, and often purchase stop-loss insurance to limit their exposure.   
Demographic factor is a measure that reflects the family size, age, and gender 
composition of enrollees in a given plan.  Plan design factor captures the generosity of 
benefits for a particular plan-year, including copays.  Both factors are calculated by the 
source, and the formulae were not disclosed to us.  The number of enrollees in LEHID 
plans averages 4.7 million per year.  Given an average family size above 2, this implies 
roughly 10 million Americans are represented in the sample in a typical year. 
  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for self-insured and fully 
insured plans, respectively.  Notable in Table 2 is the steep decline in the number of fully 
insured plans from 2004-2006.  This decline mirrors declines observed in data on similar-
sized firms from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component, which 
conducts semi-regular annual surveys of employers of sampled individuals.
12  There are 
several possible reasons fully insured plans have become less attractive for large firms, 
including the diminishing distinction between non-HMOs and HMOs (sometimes 
available only as a fully insured product), and the potential that insurance carriers are 
charging increasing risk premia (perhaps due to market power).  This is an important 
subject for future research.  For the present study, our main concern is that selection out 
of full insurance could be correlated with the timing of reform; we address this in the 
empirical work that follows and find no such pattern. 
  We also note that some multisite firms may negotiate deals entailing the same 
premium for a given plan across multiple locations.  Unfortunately, we cannot identify 
observations belonging to such agreements, nor is it possible to use observed premiums 
to infer which plans are part of such a contract.
13  However, to the extent such agreements 
take place, our estimates will be conservative: premiums for such plans cannot exhibit 
state-specific responses to any reforms.   
                                                 
12 We are grateful to Kosali Simon for tabulating the MEPS-IC data to investigate this trend. 
13 We observe the average premium per plan-year, where a plan is a unique combination of employer, 
market, insurance carrier, and plan type.  Even if Company X’s Blue Cross HMO has the same premium, 
by family size, across all markets, the average premium will take on different values across these markets 
due to differences in family size at each site.    
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  Before proceeding to the analyses, we evaluate the representativeness of the 
LEHID data.  The best source for nationally-representative estimates of employer-
sponsored health insurance premiums is the annual Employer Health Benefits Survey, 
sponsored jointly by the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and the Health Research and 
Educational Trust (HRET).
14  Using these data, KFF/HRET report the average growth in 
premiums for a family of four.  Although we would not expect premium levels to be 
similar for this sample and the LEHID sample (both because the selection of firms is 
nonrandom and because family sizes differ across plans), if growth rates are similar this 
would suggest the results of our study are applicable to a broader sample of employers 
because all specifications rely on premium growth over time.  Appendix Figure 1 graphs 
the annual growth rate for employee-weighted premiums against that reported by 
KFF/HRET. The trends in both samples are very similar over time.  Dafny (2009) also 
reports that the ratio of sampled enrollees to total insured lives (available at the county-
level from the US Census of 2000) varies little across geographic markets. 
 
III.  Identification Strategy 
 
We identify the effect of tort reform based on changes to state laws.  Throughout 
our analysis we carefully consider the risk of legislative endogeneity, i.e. the possibility 
that changes in premiums prompt the passage of laws rather than vice versa.  This may be 
of particular concern because at times tort reforms were limited to medical malpractice 
instead of applying generally (e.g., to product liability and automobile accidents).  We 
will rely on trends in the data immediately prior to the passage of reforms to assess the 
likelihood of this threat to the identification strategy.   
We conduct our analysis separately for self-insured and full-insured plans.  In a 
“self-insured” plan, employers are responsible for their employees’ medical costs, though 
employers retain an insurance carrier as an administrator and may purchase stop-loss 
coverage.  By contrast, in a “fully insured” plan the insurer is responsible for payment.  
                                                 
14 The KFF/HRET survey randomly selects public and private employers to obtain national data about 
employer-sponsored health insurance; approximately 2000 employers respond each year.  The data are not 
publicly available, nor is the sample designed to provide estimates at the market level  
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There are three reasons to consider these plan types separately.  First, they are different 
products and hence have different pricing.  Reported self-insured plan “premiums” are 
actually estimates of employers’ projected healthcare expenditures, rather than final 
figures that reflect all expenses, including risk premiums charged by insurers.
15 Second, 
self-insured plans are regulated under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act 
(ERISA) at the national level and are exempt from state regulations, including health 
insurance premium taxes and mandated benefits.  The regulatory uniformity of self-
insured plans reduces the chances for legislative endogeneity of state reforms in this 
sample.  For example, a state that enacts an expensive mandate for infertility benefits 
may experience large fully-insured premium increases and enact tort reforms to offset 
them.  The benefit mandate would not impact self-insured plans in that state.  (Of course, 
we test for the presence of legislative endogeneity empirically, but a priori this concern is 
lesser in the self-insured sample.)  Finally, in our sample over 90% of fully insured plans 
are offered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), which engage in greater 
utilization review and employ gatekeeper physicians.  HMOs have greater incentive and 
ability to reduce unnecessary care even absent tort reform, hence responses in the fully-
insured sample may be attenuated. 
a.  Timing of tort reform 
  
We date tort reforms using the third edition of the Database of State Tort Law 
Reforms (DSTLR 3
rd).  This dataset, discussed at length in Avraham (2006), was 
assembled by reviewing the laws and court cases of the 50 states (and Washington DC) 
from 1980 to 2008 and comparing them to existing tort law compilations.
16 The process 
revealed that commonly used dating schemes suffer from missed reforms, missing or 
erroneously coded effective dates of reforms, and missing or erroneously coded state 
supreme court decisions striking down or upholding reforms. The DSTLR 3
rd edition is 
                                                 
15 Stop loss premiums are included in these estimates, but the amount of coverage is not the same across all 
employers (and some do not purchase any). 
16 The dataset is available for free download at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711.The compilations include: The American Tort 
Reform Association’s compilation (2007); a compilation by the National Conference of State Legislators 
(2007); American Medical Liability Association's Comparison of State Medical Liability Laws; Westlaw's 
50 State Survey (2006); Congressional Research Service (2005).  
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the most comprehensive and accurate dataset on tort reform legislation to date.  Currie 
and MacLeod (2008) provide independent corroboration of the tort reform timings used 
here.  
There are seven common tort reforms enacted during the period under study. 
They include a variety of damage caps, damage payment reforms, and reforms of joint 
and several liability.
17  However, we have sufficient variation during our study period 
(1998 to 2006) to analyze only four in detail: caps on non-economic damages, caps on 
punitive damages, reform to the collateral source rule, and limits on joint and several 
liability.    (For robustness, we also estimate models using the simple count of the seven 
common reforms.)  Appendix Table 3 lists the states enacting and repealing all seven 
reforms during our study period.
18  Note that reforms are coded as of July 1
st, and refer to 
effective dates as opposed to enactment dates.   We now describe the four key reforms in 
greater detail., emphasizing the number of changes to each that occur between 1998 and 
2005.  (Because premiums for 2006, our final year of premium data, are set in 2005, only 
changes in law through 2005 are effectively incorporated in our analysis.) 
Caps on Non-Economic Damages.  Non-economic damages encompass pain and 
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium.  Such damages can comprise 
a significant fraction of total damage awards and have often been the focus of tort reform 
advocates.
19  Caps vary across many dimensions.  Some reforms impose a cap of a fixed 
dollar amount, while others use a multiplier of the economic damages.  Some are indexed 
to inflation, some are not.   In addition, the level of caps varies from state to state. By 
2007, twenty-six states had capped non-economic damages.  Between 1998 to 2005 
                                                 
17 Reforms related to patient compensation funds are excluded from this list for lack of activity during the 
study period.  A patient compensation fund is a state fund which usually pays medical malpractice victims 
monies if the damages awarded are above some threshold, such as $400,000. The rationale is that the fund 
lowers physicians’ premiums and spreads the risk of risky medical specialties across the entire population 
of physicians and taxpayers.   In the mid-1980s, a few states changed their policies regarding contingency 
fees, capping plaintiffs’ lawyers’ share in the recovery.  
18 Because health insurance premiums are set prospectively, our baseline models lag the reform indicators 
by one year.  For this reason, the table and ensuing discussion refer to changes that take effect during the 
years 1998-2005, inclusive. 
19 Avraham (2006) cites sources claiming that non-economic damages account for up to 50% of total 
recoveries in product liability cases.   
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twelve states enacted or struck down caps on non-economic damages for medical 
malpractice.  
  Caps on Punitive Damages. Punitive damages are those in excess of actual losses 
suffered and are intended, as the name implies, to punish the perpetrator.  By 2007 thirty 
states had enacted caps on punitive damages. Between 1998 to 2005 nine states enacted 
or struck down caps on punitive damages, one of which applies only to medical 
malpractice (Maine). Punitive damages are reputed to be rare in the case of medical 
malpractice.  However, as Polinsky (1997) argues, even the remote possibility of large 
damage claims may have a significant impact on providers’ behavior.  
  Collateral Source Reforms. Discretionary or mandatory consideration of collateral 
sources of payment for medical costs is one of the most common tort reforms.  The 
collateral source rule was developed by common law courts in the 19
th century when 
insurance became more common.  The rule generally holds that the plaintiff's personal 
insurance coverage cannot be used to offset the defendant’s share of damages.  The result 
is that an insured plaintiff may receive more than his full harm in the case of an accident.  
States coded as having reformed the collateral source rule have abrogated the common 
law and either require or allow courts to reduce the plaintiff's recovery by the amount of 
private or public insurance benefits he receives (taking into account the accumulated paid 
premium).  By 2007 thirty-four states had reformed the collateral source rule in this way. 
Between 1998 to 2005, six states enacted or struck down the collateral source rule for 
medical malpractice claims. In addition, Alabama reformed the collateral source rule for 
all types of claims.  
    Joint and Several Liability. Under the common law rule of joint and several 
liability, the plaintiff can collect the entire damages award from any of the defendants 
found liable in the lawsuit, regardless of their percentage of liability. This allows 
plaintiffs to pursue defendants with “deep pockets” and collect the full recovery from 
them.  In medical malpractice cases, the deep pockets are likely hospitals and practice 
groups.  States have limited plantiffs’ access to deep pockets by modifying the joint and 
several liability rule in various ways, primarily by limiting each defendant’s liability to its 
proportional share.  This forces patients to collect more from individual doctors, who 
typically bear the largest share of responsibility for negligence.  Thus, joint and several  
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liability reform puts greater liability pressure on doctors and reduces that on other 
providers.  In addition, joint and several liability reform may limit the amount of recovery 
a plaintiff can make, not unlike a cap.  Doctors are not deep pockets because they have 
insurance coverage limits and personal assets that are protected in the case of bankruptcy, 
effectively capping plaintiffs’ recoveries.  Between 1998 to 2005 six states enacted or 
struck down reforms of the joint and several liability rule, one of which applied solely to 
medical malpractice (Nevada).    
b.   Specifications 
Our primary specifications regress premiums at the plan-year level on indicators 
for insurance reforms, which vary at the state-year level.
20  All models are estimated by 
weighted least squares, using the average number of enrollees in each plan (over time) as 
weights.  The weights help us to obtain representative estimates of the effect of reform 
and also act to reduce the influence of smaller markets, in which the smaller sample sizes 
imply a greater risk of measurement error.  We report standard errors clustered by state to 
allow for correlation in the error terms across plans within the same state. 
  As noted earlier, we estimate all models separately by insurance type (self-insured 
and fully insured).  The baseline specification is as follows: 
     
p(m)t t m p
t m p t m p mt t m p design   plan cs demographi eform R Tort ) ln(premium       (1)
ε + τ + ρ +
ϑ + ϕ + γ + α = −
) (
) ( ) ( 1 ) (  
 
The subscript p(m)t refers to a plan p (which is defined within a particular market m) and 
year t.  TortReform is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 in the year following 
the implementation of the reform in question.  This lag reflects the timing of insurance 
contracts, which are typically finalized three or more months prior to the calendar year in 
which they take effect.  Recall also the reform database codes reforms as present if 
enacted by July.  Thus, a reform implemented in June 2002 can impact premiums for 
2003 and beyond.  (Subsequent specifications include a more flexible lag structure.) We 
                                                 
20 Of the 139 geographic markets represented in LEHID, 138 can be matched uniquely to a single state.  
Plans in the Rhode Island/southern Massachusetts market are matched with reform data for Massachusetts; 
this choice is immaterial as neither state enacted or repealed any of the seven reforms.     
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present estimates including each of the four reforms described above singly as well as 
altogether.  In addition, we report specifications using the sum of the seven most common 
reforms.  This index, which incorporates reforms that were not adopted frequently 
enough during our study period to permit individual consideration, allows us to test the 
average impact of introducing an additional liability limitation.   
  Equation (1) also includes the two time-varying plan-specific measures available 
in the data: demographics and plan design.  Both are associated with higher costs and 
should have positive coefficient estimates.   ) (m p ρ  and  t τ  represent plan and year fixed 
effects, respectively.  The estimate of γ therefore captures the impact of reforms on 
premium growth for the same  healthplan over time, controlling for average national 
premium growth. (Note that state fixed effects are superfluous, as plans are specific to 
markets and markets are finer geographic areas than states.)  Including plan fixed effects 
reduces the potential for omitted variables bias due to changes in the composition of 
plans over time.  For example, if tort reform reduces premiums and prompts more 
employers to select more expensive carrier-plantype combinations (e.g. the Blue Cross 
PPO instead of the Humana PPO or HMO), the effect of tort reform on premiums will be 
understated in the absence of plan fixed effects.   
A consequence of these fixed effects is that only employers who appear in the 
sample for two or more years and who “straddle” one or more reforms can help to 
identify the coefficients of interest.    Although the median number of years an employer 
appears in our sample is only two, virtually all employers are active in multiple markets. 
As there are 33 separate legal changes (see Appendix Table 3), most employers are 
affected by some reform.  In addition, when we estimate leads and lagged effects of 
reform, more firms will contribute identifying information.   
  After estimating these baseline regressions, we expand the model in three ways.  
First, we include leads and lags of TortReform.  The coefficients on the former will reveal 
the presence of legislative endogeneity, if any, and on the latter the timing of the response 
to the legislation.  On one hand, a delayed response is likely given uncertainty around the 
effect of the law and the lag before changes in damage awards, malpractice premiums, 
and  physician behavior are reflected in healthcare costs.  On the other, responses could  
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even precede effective reform dates if insurance carriers and self-insured firms 
incorporate the expected impact of reform in their premiums. 
  Second, we test whether the effect of reform varies by plan type (indemnity, PPO, 
POS and HMO).  The results will reveal whether reform has less of an impact in a 
managed care environment.  The third and final extension of the basic model exploits 
differences in the market concentration of insurance providers as another layer of 
variation in addition to the adoption of reform.  We anticipate that any cost reductions 
induced by tort reform should be passed on to a greater degree in more competitive 
markets.
21    We use the number of carriers per market as a proxy for the degree of 
competition. Given the non-random nature of the sample, the number of carriers is less 
likely to be measured with error than alternative measures of market competition such as 
the HHI.  To allow for a non-linear relationship between competition and cost pass-
through, we interact TortReform with indicators for quintiles of the distribution of 
number of carriers (NC) per market-year: 
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This specification includes main effects for the quintiles (save one omitted category), as 
there is some movement across quintiles over time. 
 
IV.  Results 
a.  Main findings  
  Table 1 presents results from our baseline specification, which reflects a simple 
before-after estimate of the effect of each reform in the self-insured and fully insured 
samples.  In the self-insured sample, three of the four reforms are associated with a 
                                                 
21Although it is theoretically possible for a monopoly to pass on as much or more of a cost reduction as a 
competitive firm, this requires the elasticity of demand to increase in price.  More importantly, if firms 
engage in first-degree price discrimination, then a monopoly will always pass through less of a cost 
reduction than a more competitive market. Dafny (2009) shows insurers in the least competitive markets 
effectively engage in first-degree price discrimination, charging higher premium increases to employers 
experiencing positive profit shocks.     
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statistically-significant decline in premiums on the order of 1.3 to 1.4 percent.  The 
exception is caps on punitive damages, for which the point estimate is negative but 
imprecisely estimated.  Column 5 reports the result obtained using the sum of all seven 
possible reforms, which represents the intensity of tort reforms in a state-year.  The point 
estimate of -.003 (p<.10) implies that moving from no limitations on tort liability to 
seven reduces premiums by 2.1 percent.   Of course, this specification weights all reforms 
equally.  If some reforms have little effect, aggregating them masks the effect of 
individually significant reforms.  However, because reforms are sometimes implemented 
at the same time, estimating them separately may overstate their impact.  Thus, column 6 
includes the four key tort reforms from columns 1 through 4 simultaneously.  The 
collateral source rule and caps on non-economic damages have clear independent effects, 
while the coefficient on joint and several liability is now small and statistically 
insignificant.   We draw no inference here because there are few cases in which joint and 
several liability reform takes place separately from other reforms and hence it is difficult 
to identify its effect.  We reject the null hypothesis that all reforms have no impact with a 
p-value of 0.03. 
In the sample of fully insured plans, the coefficients on reforms are not 
statistically significant when entered separately (columns 1-4) or as a sum (column 5).  
However, the results in Column 6 (four key reforms entered simultaneously) suggest that 
caps on punitive damages decrease insurance premiums while caps on non-economic 
damages  increase insurance premiums.  The joint test of reforms is not significant, 
however, with a p-value of .16. 
Next, we expand the models in columns 1 through 4 by including leads and lags 
for each reform.  Figures 1 and 2 present estimates from these models for the self-insured 
and fully insured samples, respectively (corresponding to Tables 2 and 3).  The excluded 
category is three years or more prior to reform. None of the leads in Table 2 is 
statistically significant.  Thus, there is no evidence that plans in states with future reforms 
exhibit different premium growth than plans in states without such reforms.  In addition, 
there is no significant effect of reform in the year of implementation. Based on the point 
estimates, the premium reduction associated with reforms generally increases slightly 
over time.  By three years post-reform, all four of the reforms are associated with  
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significant reductions in premiums.  Only reforms to joint and several liability do not 
appear to have increasing effects over time. 
By contrast, in the fully-insured sample we do not find responses to any of the 
reforms.  A pre-reform trend is evident for caps on punitive damages, implying some 
states may have enacted these reforms in response to rising full insurance premiums.  The 
pattern of coefficients for the other three reforms do not suggest legislative endogeneity.   
For caps on non-economic damages, premiums increase two years prior to reform, but 
remain roughly constant thereafter. Neither collateral source nor joint and several liability 
reforms show signs of legislative endogeneity, and the latter is associated with a premium 
increase three years out.  In sum, we find no evidence that tort reform reduces full-
insurance premiums.   
We pause here to note the magnitude and plausibility of some of the estimated 
coefficients.  The point estimates we obtain using the self-insured sample and the model 
including the four key reforms (Table 1, Column 6) sum to -2.3 percent.  These results 
are smaller than Kessler and McClellan’s estimate of a 4 to 9 percent reduction from 
“direct reforms” for Medicare heart patients.  However, the specifications that permit the 
effect to vary over time reveal deeper reductions three or more years after the passage of 
reform.   We caution that our results are not directly comparable to those of Kessler and 
McClellan because we examine a slightly different reform mix,
22 Kessler and McClellan 
measure costs (whereas we measure insurance premiums), and their study pertains to one 
medical condition and the elderly population.  
b.  Extensions and Robustness 
Do Effects Vary by Plan-Type?  Table 4 presents results obtained when interacting the 
individual reform dummies or the sum of reforms with plan type, using the self-insured 
sample.  (Because over 90% of fully insured plans are HMOs, we lack the power to 
estimate this model using the fully insured sample.)  The coefficients on the interactions 
                                                 
22 Kessler and McClellan define “direct reforms” as caps on punitive or non-economic damages, collateral 
source reform, or reduction of prejudgment interest.  We believe that the abolition of prejudgment interest 
should have a fairly small impact, as inflation in the years of the study was not high, enabling a fairly 
straightforward comparison.    
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with PPO plans are negative and statistically significant in all five specifications.   
Although the standard errors do not permit strong inferences about differences between 
the categories, hypothesis tests confirm that the PPO interactions are statistically different 
from the HMO or POS interactions in half of the specifications.   
There are no significant reactions among managed-care plans (HMO and POS 
plans), with the exception of joint and several liability reform. We return to this result 
momentarily.  In addition, we do not find significant responses among indemnity plans, 
although a priori we anticipated a response similar to that of PPOs.  However, there was a  
rapid shift away from indemnity plans over the course of our study period, so these 
estimates are obtained using a very small sample. 
To confirm the robustness of the results by plan type, Appendix Table 4 reports 
the coefficients obtained when estimating this specification on the combined (fully 
insured + self-insured ) sample.  The results are strikingly similar to Table 4 and further 
confirm the hypothesis that HMOs are largely unaffected by reform. 
The negative, significant effect of joint and several liability reform on HMO 
premiums may reflect the fact that joint and several liability reform directly reduces 
liability pressures for HMOs.  In recent decades courts have found HMOs (and not just 
hospitals) liable under joint and several liability.
23   However, we take the result as 
suggestive but not conclusive.  It is difficult to identify the effect of joint and several 
liability separately from that of the other reforms (see Table 1, Column 6).  Furthermore, 
the impact of joint and several liability reform on HMOs is small and imprecisely 
estimated in the pooled sample in Appendix Table 4. 
On balance, the results suggest that the premium reductions associated with tort 
reform are generally concentrated in the PPO category.  These findings support the 
hypothesis that managed care and tort reform are partial substitutes for reducing medical 
expenditures.  In addition, the lack of response by HMO plans in the self-insured sample 
is consistent with our finding of little effect in the fully insured sample, which is 
dominated by HMOs.   
 
                                                 
23 Currie and MacLeod (2008) argue that joint and several liability reform better aligns incentives by 
placing more liability on the agent-doctor, who is better able to prevent harm.    
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Do Effects Vary by Concentration of the Local Insurance Market? Holding constant the 
impact of tort reform on healthcare costs, premium reductions should be steeper in more 
competitive insurance markets.  To explore this prediction, we interact the tort reform 
indicators from our baseline models with quintiles for the number of insurers in the 
relevant market-year.  In the self-insured sample (Table 5), there is no significant 
premium response to caps on punitive damages in any quintile, as in the baseline 
specification.  However, for all other reforms, there is a contrast in the results for the least 
competitive quintile (in which reductions are never significant and point estimates are 
small) and the two most competitive quintiles (in which reductions are almost always 
significant and the magnitudes are larger relative to the least competitive quintile), 
although the differences are only statistically significant for caps on non-economic 
damages.  The results for the fully-insured sample reveal no evidence of greater 
responsiveness to tort reform in more competitive markets, consistent with the general 
weakness of the findings from the basic specifications. 
 
Selection out of the Fully Insured Sample.  Although we have treated the self-insured and 
fully insured samples separately, among the set of large firms in our sample these two 
options are substitutes.  Thus, high premiums in one sector could spur growth in the 
other.  If movement in and out of these samples is correlated with tort reform, some of 
our estimated effects could be affected by changes in sample composition.  (Given the 
inclusion of plan fixed effects in all models, such movements are unlikely to affect the 
results regardless of whether they are correlated with tort reform.  It would have to be the 
case that new self-insured plans spurred by tort reform, for example, have systematically 
faster or slower growth than pre-existing self-insured plans.)  For good measure, 
however, we examine whether the propensity to fully insure is affected by tort reform.  
For this analysis, we aggregate the data to the employer-market-year level and estimate 
models using the proportion of employees enrolled in fully insured plans as the 
dependent variable.  These models include the leads and lags of the individual reforms 
and employer-market and year fixed effects.  Observations are weighted by the average 
number of enrollees in each employer-market.  The results are presented in Table 6.  We  
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find no evidence of selection into or out of the fully insured market (or equivalently, out 
or into the self-insured market) in the years preceding (or following) any of the reforms. 
 
Changes in Plan Quality.  We control for plan design throughout the analysis so we can 
make reliable price comparisons for the same plan over time.  One concern is that our 
plan design variable may be an imperfect proxy for plan generosity.  For example, one 
way employers may respond to a decrease (increase) in costs is through more (less) 
generous benefits.  This would lead to downward-biased (i.e. conservative) estimates of 
the impact of reforms.  To gauge whether plan generosity changes over time, Table 7 
presents estimates of the baseline specifications using plan design as the dependent 
variable (rather than a control) and the self-insured sample  Both collateral source and 
joint and several liability reforms are associated with small but significant increases in 
plan generosity.  To the extent that our measure of plan design is correlated with omitted 
measures of plan generosity, our estimates of the premium reductions associated with 
these two reforms will be conservative. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  Tort reform is among the most popular cost-control initiatives implemented by 
individual states.  President Obama recently reasserted his commitment to some tort 
reform as a way to reduce medical costs, although he stopped short of advocating caps on 
damages.
24 Prior to this study, the only rigorous empirical estimates of the impact of 
reforms were based on particular conditions with heavy malpractice caseloads, namely 
deliveries and heart disease.  These may not be representative of healthcare at large and 
have led to wide variations in the estimated impact of reform.  For example, in 2002 the 
Department of Health and Human Services asserted that tort reform could reduce 
                                                 
24   Remarks by the President to the Annual Conference of the American Medical Association (2009).  
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Annual-
Conference-of-the-American-Medical-Association/.  
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healthcare costs by 5%-9%, while the Congressional Budget Office concluded reforms 
would have little impact.
25 
  To assess the aggregate impact of reforms, we used  a database of employer-
sponsored healthplans covering over 10 million nonelderly Americans each year.  To the 
extent private insurers pass through cost changes associated with reforms, premiums will 
reflect the impact of reforms across the entire spectrum of healthcare.  We find evidence 
that caps on non-economic damages, collateral source reform, and joint and several 
liability reform reduce self-insured premiums by 1 to 2 percent each.   When the effects 
of reform are estimated jointly, caps on non-economic damages and collateral source 
remain independently significant and their point estimates imply a joint reduction of 
healthcare costs of 2.3 percent.  In addition, the effect of reform tends to increase over 
time.  
The magnitudes of the estimated effects far exceed any savings from reducing 
direct liability costs, which are at most two percent of total health costs.     For example, 
suppose caps on non-economic damages reduce awards and malpractice costs by one-
quarter (a high-end estimate).  This would reduce health care costs by 0.5%, only a 
fraction of our estimated impact of imposing these caps (~1.3%).   Thus, if the point 
estimates are correct, treatment intensity must have been affected by reform. 
By contrast, we do not find evidence of reductions in fully insured premiums. The 
absence of a response is consistent with monitoring of medical practices by HMOs, 
which comprise 90 percent of fully insured plans.  We corroborate this conjecture by 
finding that cost reductions in our self-insured sample are concentrated outside of 
managed care plans.  Thus, we conclude that tort reform reduces medical costs outside of 
a managed care environment, implying that physicians are most responsive to liability 
pressures when they have the most control over treatment choices.  These results 
                                                 
25 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Confronting the New Health Care Crisis: Improving 
Health Care Quality and Lowering Costs by Fixing Our Medical Liability System (2002).  
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf, p. 5.  Congressional Budget Office.  Limiting Tort Liability 
for Medical Malpractice.  Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office (2004).  Available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf. 
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constitute the first evidence that tort reform reduces healthcare expenditures broadly 
(albeit not in a managed-care environment). Importantly, our results suggest the savings 
generated by tort reform are not offset by increases in induced demand or increases in 
short-run remediation of medical errors.   To understand the social welfare implications 
of these reforms, however, additional research on health outcomes and long-run costs is 
needed.   
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Table 1:  Effect of Reforms on Premiums 
 
 
  Self-Insured Sample  Fully-Insured Sample 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                
Caps Punitive Reform  -0.008        -0.000  -0.009        -0.028 
  (0.006)        (0.006)  (0.008)        (0.011)** 
Collateral Source    -0.014      -0.010   0.010      0.016 
Reform   (0.005)***       (0.005)**   (0.010)      (0.013) 
Caps Non-Economic      -0.013     -0.011     0.019     0.024 
Damages     (0.006)**     (0.005)**     (0.013)     (0.014)* 
Joint & Several       -0.013   -0.002      0.008  -0.009 
Liability      (.005)**   (0.004)      (0.011)  (0.014) 
Sum of Seven Common 
Reforms        -0.003 
(0.002)*        0.005 
(0.004)   
Joint Test of Reforms 
(p-value)         0.032        0.162 
R-Squared  0.789  0.789  0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.  All specifications include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects for plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-
year.  Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each plan. N=163,857 for Self-Insured; N= 76,803 for Fully-Insured. 
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Table 2:  Effect of Reforms on Self-Insured Premiums, by Year 
 
 
  Caps Punitive  Collateral Source  Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & Several 
Liability 
-2 Year Reform  -0.000 -0.005 0.003  0.006 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
-1 Year Reform  -0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.003 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year of Reform  -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) 
+1 Year Reform  -0.007 -0.006 -0.014 -0.020 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)  (0.006)*** 
+2 Year  Reform  -0.015 -0.022 -0.008 -0.014 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
≥+3 Years Reform  -0.027 -0.023 -0.018 -0.015 
  (0.013)** (0.009)** (0.009)**  (0.007)* 
R-Squared  0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by state.  All specifications include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects for 
plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-year.   Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each 
plan.   N=163,857. 
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Table 3:  Effect of Reforms on Fully-Insured Premiums, by Year 
 
 
  Caps Punitive  Collateral Source  Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & Several 
Liability 
-2 Year Reform  0.020 -0.009 0.004 0.010 
  (0.008)** (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
-1 Year Reform  0.022 0.006 0.029 0.008 
  (0.012)* (0.020) (0.016)* (0.017) 
Year of Reform  0.023 -0.001 0.024 -0.003 
  (0.012)* (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.024) 
+1 Year Reform  0.002 0.006 0.023 -0.004 
  (0.012) (0.026) (0.019) (0.014) 
+2 Year  Reform  -0.002 0.003 0.051 -0.003 
  (0.014)  (0.032) (0.020)** (0.029) 
≥+3 Years Reform  -0.016 0.013 0.029 0.029 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.022)  (0.011)*** 
R-Squared  0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by state.  All specifications include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects for 
plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-year.   Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each 
plan.   N=76,803. 
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Table 4:  Effect of Reforms on Self-Insured Premiums, by Plan Type 
 
 
  Caps Punitive  Collateral 
Source 
Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & Several 
Liability 
Sum of 
Reforms 
HMO*Reform  0.000 -0.010 0.032 -0.027 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.012) (0.019)  (0.009)***  (0.006) 
POS*Reform  0.021 -0.015 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.023) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) 
PPO*Reform  -0.032 -0.018 -0.033 -0.020 -0.008 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** 
Indemnity*Reform  0.017  0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) 
p-value for H0:       
PPO*Reform= 
HMO*Reform  
 
PPO*Reform = 
POS*Reform 
0.00 
 
 
0.04 
 
0.44 
 
 
0.78 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.03 
 
0.60 
 
 
0.19 
 
0.17 
 
 
0.04 
 
R-Squared  0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.  All specifications include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects 
for plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-year.    Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each plan.  
N=163,857.  
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Table 5:  Effect of Reforms on Self-Insured Premiums, by Competitiveness 
of Insurance Market 
 
 
 
Caps Punitive  Collateral 
Source 
Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & 
Several 
Liability 
Sum of 
Reforms 
NCq1*Reform  -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) 
NCq2*Reform  -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.024 -0.004 
  (0.009)  (0.006)** (0.006)**  (0.007)*** (0.002)* 
NCq3*Reform  -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.024 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.006)* (0.006)  (0.006)***  (0.002) 
NCq4*Reform  -0.008 -0.019 -0.017 -0.015 -0.006 
 (0.008)  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.007)**  (0.002)** 
NCq5*  Reform  -0.010  -0.016  -0.021  -0.008  -0.003 
 (0.007)  (0.007)**  (0.007)***  (0.006)  (0.002) 
R-Squared  0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state; standard errors in brackets are clustered by state-year.  All specifications 
include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects for plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-year.    The intervals 
for the number of carrier quintiles are [1,9] (ncq1) [10,11] (ncq2) [12,14] ncq3 [15,17] (ncq4) and [18,31] (ncq5).  Observations are 
weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each plan.  N=163,857. 
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Table 6:  Effect of Reforms on Percent of Employees in Fully-Insured Plans, 
By Year 
 
  Caps Punitive  Collateral Source  Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & Several 
Liability 
-2 Year Reform  -0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.024 
  (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) 
-1 Year Reform  -0.017 0.026 -0.028 -0.003 
  (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) (0.011) 
Year of Reform  -0.054 0.000 -0.019 0.005 
  (0.045) (0.021) (0.028) (0.014) 
+1 Year Reform  -0.028 -0.011 0.000  0.018 
  (0.046) (0.019) (0.042) (0.027) 
+2 Year  Reform  -0.057 0.004 0.006 0.007 
  (0.054) (0.030) (0.043) (0.027) 
≥+3 Years Reform  0.010 -0.003 -0.041 -0.031 
  (0.042) (0.038) (0.034) (0.020) 
R-Squared  0.765 0.764 0.764 0.764 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by state.  All specifications include fixed effects for employer-markets and years.  The 
unit of observation is the employer-market-year.    Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each 
employer-market.   N=116,762.  
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Table 7:  Effect of Reforms on Generosity of Self-Insured Plans 
  
 
  Dependent variable is “plan design factor” 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Caps Punitive Reform  0.002        0.001 
  (0.002)        (0.001) 
Collateral Source    0.005      0.003 
Reform   (0.001)***       (0.002) 
Caps Non-Economic      -0.001     -0.003 
Damages     (0.002)     (0.002) 
Joint & Several       0.004   0.003 
Liability      (.002)**   (0.003) 
Sum of Reforms        0.001 
(0.001)     
Joint Test of Reforms 
(p-value)         0.010 
R-Squared  0.279  0.280  0.279 0.279 0.279 0.280 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.  All specifications include demographic factor and fixed 
effects for plans and years. The unit of observation is the plan-year.  Observations are weighted by the mean number of 
enrollees in each plan. N=163,857.  
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Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Self-Insured Plans 
            
  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
            
Premium  ($)  4277  4306 4580 5012 5644 6460 7000 7460 7892 
  1134  1230 1319 1357 1437 1582 1701 1799 1948 
Number  of  Enrollees  191  159 151 169 167 175 170 192 179 
  726  602 507 576 612 639 530 862 610 
Demographic  Factor  2.42  2.29 2.26 2.27 2.28 2.30 2.32 2.31 1.84 
  0.52  0.45 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.40 
Plan  Design  1.02  1.01 0.99 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.97 0.97 
  0.07  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
P l a n   T y p e             
HMO  2.5%  4.3%  6.9%  10.0% 14.6% 16.7% 17.5% 18.0% 19.7% 
Indemnity  34.5%  31.8% 22.1% 16.7% 14.2% 10.5%  7.8%  5.9%  5.9% 
POS  36.1%  27.4% 30.5% 25.3% 20.6% 18.0% 18.2% 16.0% 15.9% 
PPO  26.8%  36.5% 40.5% 48.0% 50.6% 54.8% 56.4% 60.0% 58.5% 
              
#    of  Employers  180  193 191 233 248 315 238 256 222 
#    of  Markets  139  139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Number  of  Observations  12194  14117 14408 18460 21303 24853 20211 20794 17517 
 
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. The unit of observation is the plan-year, unless noted otherwise. Sample includes all self-insured plans. Standard deviations are 
reported in italics. Demographic factor reflects age, gender, and family size for enrollees.  Plan design measures the generosity of benefits.  Both are constructed by 
the data source and exact formulae are not available.    
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Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Fully-Insured Plans 
            
  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
            
Premium  ($)  3648  3904 4188 4621 5339 5995 6689 7181 7608 
  995  919  1010 1131 1378 1465 1818 2053 2251 
Number  of  Enrollees  170  173 164 180 190 190 176 214 236 
  487  489 420 489 499 561 504 695 749 
Demographic  Factor  2.23  2.22 2.20 2.23 2.26 2.28 2.36 2.33 1.84 
  0.44  0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.38 
Plan  Design  1.12  1.13 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.05 
  0.05  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 
P l a n   T y p e             
HMO  88.7%  90.0% 92.6% 91.9% 90.9% 92.7% 85.7% 90.5% 88.8% 
Indemnity  3.0%  0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 1.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.6% 0.4% 
POS  6.6%  6.7% 4.0% 4.8% 3.0% 4.2% 4.0% 4.5% 3.9% 
PPO  1.7%  2.4% 2.9% 3.2% 5.0% 3.0% 8.4% 4.4% 6.8% 
                             
#    of  Employers  181  197 185 226 226 274 194 203 173 
#    of  Markets  139  139 139 139 139 137 138 138 137 
Number  of  Observations  9880  11561 9253 10654  10236 8839  6364  5679  4337 
 
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. The unit of observation is the plan-year, unless noted otherwise. Sample includes all fully insured plans. Standard 
deviations are reported in italics. Demographic factor reflects age, gender, and family size for enrollees.  Plan design measures the generosity of 
benefits.  Both are constructed by the data source and exact formulae are not available.    
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Appendix Table 3 (DSTLR 3
rd) 
 
Year   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  Flips* Total 
Cap Non-
Economic 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
 
IL,OH 
 ME 
OR 
  FL,OH,MS  OK,TX  GA,NV,TN  9 
3 
12 
Caps 
Punitive 
 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
AK 
OH 
 AL,ME    AR,  MS  ID,MT  OH  8 
1 
9 
Collateral  
Source 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
 
OH 
  AL  OH,  PA  WV  OK   5 
1 
6 
Joint &  
Several 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
 
IL,OH 
    PA  AR,OH,NV    4 
2 
6 
Periodic  
Payment 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
    PA  OH  TX  GA 
AL 
4 
1 
5 
Split 
Recovery 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
AK 
FL 
   P A     C A , M T   4  
1 
5 
Punitive 
Evidence 
Enactments 
Strike 
downs 
 
KY 
 F L     A R     2  
1 
3 
 
* Because insurance premiums are set the year prior and our insurance data run from 1998 to 2006, the relevant years for identification are changes from 1998 to 2005. 
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  Appendix Table 4:  Effect of Reforms on Premiums, by Plan Type 
(Self + Fully-Insured Premiums) 
 
  Caps Punitive  Collateral 
Source 
Caps Non-
Economic 
Joint & Several 
Liability 
Sum of Reforms 
HMO*Reform  -0.010 -0.001 0.023 -0.006 0.004 
  (0.005)* (0.009) (0.014)* (0.010)  (0.004) 
POS*Reform  0.025 -0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.001 
  (0.023) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) 
PPO*Reform  -0.030 -0.013 -0.033 -0.017 -0.007 
  (0.006)*** (0.008)* (0.010)*** (0.008)** (0.003)*** 
Indemnity*Reform  0.020 0.013 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 
  (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) 
p-value for H0:       
PPO*Reform= 
HMO*Reform  
 
PPO*Reform = 
POS*Reform 
0.00 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.15 
 
 
0.71 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.13 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.02 
 
R-Squared  0.810 0.810 0.811 0.810 0.810 
 
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.  All specifications include plan design, demographic factor, and fixed effects for plans and years. The unit of 
observation is the plan-year.    Observations are weighted by the mean number of enrollees in each plan.  N=240,660. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Annual Premium Growth, LEHID vs. KFF/HRET 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: LEHID sample (all plans), and 2007 Kaiser/HRET Annual Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health 
Benefits  Annual growth rates for the LEHID sample are calculated using employee-weighted average 
premiums for each year.  Both sources combine fully insured and self-insured plans 